From Conflict to Peace: The Features of Post-Conflict State-Building

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The article discusses the historical and structural legacies of state-building, the issues of state-building in modern global environment, as well as the main factors conditioning the process of state-building and their features in post-conflict areas. The article also refers to the impact of legitimacy, as the latter is of notional importance both for state-building and stateness processes. The analysis of each factor is accompanied by the review of possible manifestations of key actors' role, their impact and "center-periphery" relations.

Introduction

State-building is an endogenous process strengthening the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state – conditioned by state-society relations[1]. State-building is primarily internal process, that involves local actors, which means that the role of international actors is relatively limited. However, for both recognized and especially non-recognized states the international partners – international universal, regional, governmental and non-governmental organizations and separate states, can increase the efficiency of the political and institutional processes that contribute to the formation and consolidation of the basis for state-society flexible relations. That complex and multifactorial process should be considered in the context of long-term historical and

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[1] State Building in Situations of Fragility: Initial Findings, OECD DAC, Paris, 2008; **Fritz, V., Rocha-Menocal A.,** Understanding State-Building from a Political Economy Perspective: An Analytical and Conceptual Paper on Processes, Embedded Tensions and Lessons for International Engagement, Report prepared for DFID's Effective and Fragile States Teams, 2007.

structural factors that contribute to shaping the contours of state formation and the nature of state-society relations. These may include, e.g. the effects of internal or regional conflict, the risk of a new conflict, the impact of economic losses generated by global crisis, country's external debt, limited trade opportunities, high prices of consumer goods, et.

Among the afore-named features stand out the ones, which are conditioned by state's non-recognized status. According to Roeder, who has singled out four episodic bursts of nation- state creation, the last one – emerged after the end of the Cold War – is not over yet[2]. Despite the highest rate of ethno-national claims was registered in the first half of the 1990s[3], but the studies affirm their "longevity": in 2009 18 countries in the world were still engaged in ethno-political conflicts for self-determination[4], and already in 2016 "Freedom in the World" report - annually represented by "Freedom House"[5] - outlines 2 related and 13 disputed territories[6], to which we should add also the Republic of Kosovo, which has yet gained only partial recognition. In addition, the states - emerged on the right of peoples to self-determination in the post-Cold War period – have gone through an armed conflict with the "mother" state and the greater part of them hasn't gained international

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[2]According to Roeder, since 1815 there have been four bursts in the creation of new nation-states: the classic period, from the Congress of Vienna to the Congress of Berlin; the first quarter of the twentieth century; the three decades that followed World War II; and the decade that straddled the end of the cold war; **Roeder Ph.,** Where Nation-States Come From: Institutional Change in the Age of Nationalism, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007, 5-6.

[3] **Gurr T., Marshall M.,** Peace and Conflict 2005: A global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy, College Park: Department of Government and Politics: Univ. of Maryland, 2005, 99, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/publications/papers/peace_and_conflict_2005.pdf, (17.08.2016).

[4]**Marshall M., Cole B.,** Global report 2009: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility, Center for Systemic Peace and Center for Global Policy, George Mason University, 2009, 40, http://www.systemicpeace.org/Global%20Report%202009.pdf, (17.08.2016).

[5] Freedom in the World, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016, (17.08.2016).

[6] Freedom in the World 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FITW_Report_2016.pdf, 24, (17.08.2016).

recognition yet[7]. Therefore, the study and the revelation of the features of state-building of post-conflict states (the article views as such the states emerged on the right of peoples to self-determination, but yet non-recognized entities after the military phase) is of notional importance either from that particular state's, or regional, even global perspective. Even in the cases, when the states have proclaimed their independence in accordance to international law: on the right of peoples to self-determination, international recognition (admission to UN) is typically a political process that lasts for decades – a period, which can be crucial for state formation process. As a rule, international organizations' traditional practice excludes integration and cooperation steps with non-recognized states (although there are some exceptions, as the case of Kosovo)[8]. However, it is clear that such approach conflicts not only with reasonable logic, but also fundamental principles of international law, as it conditions the support to elimination of burdensome losses, that the self-determining people had to face during the armed conflict (often arisen because of "mother" state's aggression). What is of notional importance, such support is and should not have direct connection with international recognition. Whereas, according to the international law actions towards restoration of losses and especially exclusion of likelihood of people's further sufferings should be implemented unconditionally and without any hesitation. The success of such measures and actions largely depends on the efficiency of assessment mechanisms of that processes.

The article discusses the impact of features typical to post-conflict phase on the main factors conditioning state-building process. These features can be classified into the following four groups:

- consequences of the conflict,
- challenges of the conflict phase,
- lack of experience and knowledge of building sovereign state,
- consequences of non-recognized status.

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[7] A Safer world: State recognition and self-determination, http://www.una.org.uk/content/safer-world-state-recognition-and-self-determination, (14.06.2015).

[8] **Torosyan T.,** Ilham Aliyev Lost the Presidential Elections in Karabakh, IA REGNUM, 2012, http://regnum.ru/news/1559948.html, (In Russian, 14.02.2015).

Among the consequences of the conflict are human losses, damage of buildings and infrastructure, financial losses. The second group – challenges of post-conflict phase, represents the immense amounts of military expenditures in order to confront the threat of war resumption, as a result of that threat – migration, the lack of financial and human resources, the substantial impact of warlords on the post-conflict governance, etc. The lack of experience and knowledge of building a sovereign state has a significant effect on state-building efficiency: frequently it is required to simultaneously undertake a number of actions, e.g.: to find solutions to the emerging problems, to gain necessary knowledge, with the help of the gained experience to rectify the results of previous non-effective decisions. In the case of the states, which have emerged on the right of peoples to self-determination, but still haven't gained international recognition, the bulk of state-building problems is conditioned by the non-recognized status and its consequences. In the post-conflict phase the non-recognized states - under the terms of extremely limited economic, legal and political assistance, as well as absence or underdevelopment of international and local control mechanisms - are not only deprived of additional (often crucial) support, but can also face a bunch of new challenges, as the formation of illegal groups, illicit activities, etc. The overcoming of such challenges requires a comprehensive study of the main factors conditioning the process of state-building and their features in post-conflict areas. It is obvious, that the results of each study depend not only on current factors, but also on the historical and structural legacies of state-building – as a set of starting aspects.

Historical and Structural Legacies of State-Building

The study of historical and structural legacies is important, as established traditions, values and principles have profound influence on contemporary political processes. State-building efforts must be based on the historical experience of that particular state. The reports and guidelines represented by the Organization for Economic Co-operation

and Development (OECD)[9] are vital for the study of this issue, as they focus on historical and structural legacies and the feasible influence they have on fragile units. On the basis of the afore-mentioned documents, as well as the works dedicated to the determination and classification of the factors of historical and structural legacies, the characteristic factors can be represented by the following groups:

- *The history of state formation:* The experience of colonial past and the patterns and consequences of independence struggles may have lasting impact on how the discourses of statehood, state-building and national identity's formation and development are shaped[10.] Here we should also add the path dependencies. Path dependencies limit the options open to a society because of the way development is preconditioned through choices made in an earlier epoch, such as sub-Saharan Africa's failure to embrace competitive domestic production and investment in the decade after decolonization. In Afghanistan this can be manifested by the 'constant interference of non-state (armed) actors in political affairs'. Whereas in Kosovo the root causes of fragility are shaped by its long history of ethnic division and segregation as one central factor[11].

- *Structural cleavages within the society:* State-building process bears the impact of how the society is divided into different groups. This differentiation may depend on class, race/ethnicity, culture, territory, social, religion and center-periphery relations. It is noteworthy, that the deeper the cleavages and the resulting

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[9] State Building in Situations of Fragility: Initial Findings, OECD DAC, Paris, 2008; Concepts and Dilemmas of State-Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience, OECD/DAC Discussion Paper, OECD DAC, Paris, 2008; Do No Harm: International Support to Statebuilding, OECD DAC, Paris, 2010; Handbook on Contracting Out Government Functions and Services in Post-Conflict and Fragile Situations, OECD, Paris, 2010; States of Fragility 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2015.

[10] **Tilly Ch.,** War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, in Peter Evans (ed.), Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985.

[11] **Anten L., Briscoe I., Mezzera M.,** The Political Economy of State-Building in Situations of Fragility and Conflict: from Analysis to Strategy, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', Hague, 2012.

discrimination, the higher their chances of becoming a potential source of riot and conflict[12].

- *The history of the armed conflict:* It is suffice to note, that the armed conflicts leave abstruse marks on identity. The causes of conflict outbreak can be the relations between the afore-mentioned groups, ethnic/national self-awareness and local/regional identification, as well as extremist political stances[13].

- *Structural elements:* State fragility can be conditioned by more or less predetermined and unchangeable (in the foreseeable future) conditions. These include issues, such as being surrounded by "bad neighbors", availability of independent sources of revenue (e.g. illegal production and trade of arms and drugs, trafficking, non-taxable import and export, etc.), which significantly reduce elite's dependence from taxpayers, as well as accountability mechanisms associated with it. At the same time, the incorrect use of natural resources by the government: i.e. solely for own interests, may become a real pest for the efficiency of state-building and stateness processes[14]. Yet another crucial structural element is the geography of the state. A number of geographical factors are statistically correlated with greater incidence of civil war or state fragility: the size of a country, a large population, a landlocked position, and mountainous areas. The effect of size, coupled with difficult access and communication resulting from the presence of mountains and other geographical barriers, is apparent in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In addition, the destruction of this country's physical infrastructure during years of neglect and war has added to the existing problems of remoteness and inaccessibility. Similarly, in Pakistan the mountainous character of Balochistan, Federally Administered

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[12] Ibid.

[13] **Berger M.,** From Nation-Building to State-Building: The Geopolitics of Development, the Nation State System and the Changing Global Order, *Third World Quarterly*, 2006, **27**, 1, 5-25.

[14] **Zaum D.,** The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of international Statebuilding, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

Tribal Areas and much of North West Frontier Province, and the extended desert areas in southern Punjab, eastern Sindh and parts of Balochistan, pose significant challenges to transport, communication, the delivery of goods and services, and the provision of administration and security. Neighboring Afghanistan shares the same geographical obstacles to governance along the border, as well as through most of the country[15].

- *Economic development and poverty indicator:* Poverty and inequality can be catalyst for fragility– as manifestations of various levels of exclusion, discrimination and patrimonialism (state, sub-state, community, household), as well as consequences of political and military mechanisms contributing to "capture" of the state by the elites[16]. Where economic structures are unproductive and the government is weak, divided or composed of the very interests that are at risk in any systemic economic overhaul, a process of economic reform is unlikely to take off. Where state revenues are collected and distributed in a discriminatory and predatory way, the desire to gain access to public office in order to profit from the flow of rents, or to rectify the unjust distribution, grows correspondingly stronger. One possible outcome is repression. The incumbent in a repressive state seeks to marginalize competition by emasculating democratic institutions. Typically, the security services are strong and turned into mechanisms of social control. Citizens are intimidated into submission and political opposition is made impossible. typical of large, poor and fissiparous states such as the DRC, Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan and Afghanistan, the ruler is in control of most of the sovereign rents, but is not strong enough to impose his or her monopoly of violence on sub-state groups throughout the land. Formal political institutions are

[15] **Anten L., Briscoe I., Mezzera M.,** Op. cit.

[16] World Bank, Engaging with Fragile States: An IEG Review of World Bank Support to Low-Income Countries under Stress, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2006.

entirely subordinated to this bargaining process, and "the only semi-stable outcome is an inclusive buy-in of all elites by the best-resourced actor in the marketplace"[17].

- *Institutional legacies,* which include the stoutness of state-society relations, the nature of government structures, as well as the forms of interactions between formal and non-formal institutions[18].

Each of the afore-mentioned factors is to certain extent displayed in every state. The only exception is the history of the armed conflict, as throughout their history a group of states have passed through armed conflict phase, whereas the other group hasn't. The state-building process is significantly complex for the first group, as they face and have to solve all the problems as described for each factor, and hence deserves precise study. Moreover, the continuous deepening of the globalization process during the recent decades makes that problems and challenges even more hazardous and they become regional and international security threat.

State-Building in a New Global Environment

The conditions and challenges of the contemporary world have their profound impact on the post-conflict and yet fragile states. The global discourse on human rights, democratic governance, human capacity building and global security is more than ever firmly rooted in the system of international relations and legitimizes most of international collective actions[19]. At the same time, there is a belief, that the "West" should not impose its models and norms on the countries belonging to other civilizations[20] and that state-building must be perceived as an endogenously driven process, which is both political and contextual. And, eventually, the "Global War on Terrorism" has brought forth new

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[17] **Anten L., Briscoe I., Mezzera M.,** Op. cit.

[18]**Goldstone J.,** Pathways to State Failure, *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 2008, **25**, 4, 285-296.

[19]**Fritz V., Rocha-Menocal A.,** Developmental States in the New Millennium: Concepts and Challenges for a New Aid Agenda, *Development Policy Review*, 2007, **25**, 5, 531-552.

[20] **Huntington S.,** The West: Unique, not Universal, *Foreign Affairs*, 1996, **75**, 6, 28-46.

concerns about the security threats created because of fragility and non-stability, which has added new concepts to international processes and a much stronger focus on the interconnection between security and development[21]. It's noteworthy that some aspects of globalization - primarily since the 1970s –have had precise negative effect on the elite's "willingness" to support the state-building and stateness processes in "fragile" and "weak" states. Moore, Schmidt and Unsworth have distinguished some of them:

- The rents received from the exports of illicit goods reduce the elites' interest in developing positive state-society relations, as well as delivering effective services (security and basic public services) in exchange for revenue extraction (taxation). Aid dependency can also hinder elite incentives to increase domestic resource mobilization and improve transparent public financial management.

- The modern structure of international finance has facilitated the withdrawal of the capital from the state. Financial liberalization has reduced the costs of capital mobility, and the availability of tax havens has allowed for tax evasion and money laundering of gains mainly carried out from illegal activities. This affects the accumulation of wealth and investment and concentration of infrastructure in their hands, as well as prospects for development of economic cooperation with some states.

- The thriving global commercial market of military and security services undermines the process of centralisation of security capacity in weak states. It also stimulates the elite to "privatize security", rather than provide it as a public good[22]. Another challenge for the military sector is the day-by-day developing market of arms industry and the availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW), which becomes an important driving

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[21]**Brinkerhoff D.,** Capacity Development in Fragile States: Dilemmas and Directions, *Capacity.Org,* Issue 32, 2007.
[22]**Moore M., Schmidt A., Unsworth S.,** Assuring Our Common Future in a Globalised World: The Global Context of Conflict and State Fragility, DFID background paper for the 2009 White Paper "Securing our Common Future", 2009.

force for armed conflict and armed violence within and across state boundaries[23].

In the afore-named circumstances, the elite should make a crucial decision whether to "survive" for some time through "brutal" strategy and during that period gain as much profit as possible or under domestic and global pressure to become more responsive to the establishment and development of the respect towards human rights in their state and act in accordance with the duties undertaken by the state[24]. Unfortunately, as a rule, the elite tends to choose the first, i.e. "more pleasant" variant. These pressures make some representatives of elite – mainly those with quality education and access to global communications network – a "threat" for other representatives of elite[25].

The above-outlined is quite sufficient to claim, that the conditions, challenges and incentives of state-building in the contemporary global environment radically differ from the ones existing a few decades ago. At the same time, they put forward way more recondite challenges for the states longing for stateness, especially for post-conflict ones.

The new global environment has also put its mark on the dimension and stamina of involvement of the international actors. In the new millennium, state-building has become a leading priority for the international development community. Today, almost every major bilateral and multilateral donor identifies state-building as a key objective, particularly in "fragile" states. Donors understand state-building efforts as being a broader and more complex engagement than their traditional work on capacity-building and other development challenges in more "normal" settings. The growing commitment of donors to state-building in fragile states is reflected in the expanding sets of activities being carried out in settings ranging from Afghanistan and

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[23] Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development, OECD DAC, Paris, 2009.
[24] Ibid.
[25] **Carment D., Gazo J., Prest S.,** Risk Assessment and State Failure, *Global Society*, 2007, **21**, 1, 47-69.

Iraq to a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, the Pacific and Latin America[26].

The Main Factors Conditioning State-Building

The main factors conditioning state-building are:
- Political settlement, which reflect the implicit or explicit agreement on the "rules of the game", power distribution and the political processes, through which state and society interact.
- The capability and commitment of the state to effectively fulfill its basic functions and provide key services.
- Social expectations and perceptions about what functions the state should fulfill, what terms of state-society relations should be and what ability the society should have to make its requirements "heard".
- Legitimacy as a fundamental and unconditional factor of state-building and stateness.

The article further represents the analysis of these factors alongside with reviewing the impact of key actors and the possible displays of "center-periphery" relations – taking into account the peculiarities of post-conflict state-building.

Political Settlement in Post-Conflict Environment

The prospects of state-building greatly depend on the terms of the political settlement upon which the state is founded. The notion of "political settlement", in fact, represents how the balance of power between elite groups is settled through agreement around the rules of political engagement. Political settlement can be (re)shaped as a result of a single event (e.g. signing of a peace agreement) or it may reflect the

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[26] **Fritz V., Rocha-Menocal A.,** Understanding State-Building from a Political Economy Perspective: An Analytical and Conceptual Paper on Processes, Embedded Tensions and Lessons for International Engagement, Report prepared for DFID's Effective and Fragile States Teams, 2007.

ongoing process of exchange, where dominates the position of the key actors[27].

Political settlement refers not only to formal, but also to non-formal political institutions and their links, as well as to the formal rules, principles, values and rooted traditions, which outline the political interaction and behavior – in fact representing the pivot of each political system. Political settlement is also dynamic phenomenon, that is a subject to change and transformation over time (different levels of conflict, consensus and resolution). That's not surprising, as different state and non-state actors regularly (re)establish the format of their relations[28].

However, the existence of political settlement is still not an indicator of involvement and participation. In some cases fragility reflects the uniqueness degree of the political settlement and/or the privileges of some groups over the others. Within such set of settlement domestic conflicts and instability are the result of the struggle for the redraw of the "rules of the game". Whereas, in some cases the political settlement can become entrenched and sustained – endowing a lasting character to the disputed issue. For some term in may create an impression of stability in the state, but sooner or later the long-term expel of the thick layer of the society (including ethnic minorities) from political and social processes and the horizontal inequalities may lead to internal conflict and state fragility[29]. Greater electoral competition, institutional complexity and the entry of new players and alternative sources of revenue – including foreign donors, natural resource exports and organized crime – are driving new conflicts, and "alienating" the public from their rulers. Where great progress appears to have been made, whether in the *loya jirga* of post-Taliban Afghanistan, the transition to independence in Kosovo, or the end of conflict and the inclusion of Mayan communities in Guatemalan political life, it has also brought with it alarming new quandaries. In each case, the new inclusive

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[27]**Brown S., Grävingholt J.,** Framing Paper on Political Settlements in Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, OECD INCAF framing paper, 2009.
[28]Ibid.
[29]**Stewart F.,** Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multethnic Societies, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2008; **Stewart F., Langer A., Venugopal R.,** Horizontal Inequalities and Post-Conflict Development, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2011.

character of political life gave rise soon after to the empowerment of armed groups and criminals, or the spread of clandestine practices in government[30].

The concept and practice of political settlement are closely linked to the economic one. Political settlement fundamentally affects the resource distribution process among different groups. No surprise – the control over goods and resources is unequal in all the states, but in fragile states that disproportion reaches an extreme degree[31].

The state-society relations are determined by the way political settlement results in political processes, which channel the scope of social expectations and political "voice" representing the population. Two contentious issues can be singled out here. First, there is the issue of accountability, which refers to the fact, whether there exist proper control mechanisms and opportunities, which would allow to meet the needs of the society[32]. The second issue refers to the level and quality of political involvement, which is shaped through combining the laws (formal norms), informal norms and practice – supporting the effective political participation of vulnerable groups in state's political processes. The levels of both political accountability and political involvement could emerge e.g. as a result of competitive elections[33].

Although the international society's support to states' internal political processes has significantly increased during the recent decades, the establishment of proper political settlement - ensuring agreement on the rules of political involvement, elite's law-abiding behavior, effective and capable political institutions, is not the result of foreign intervention, but the coordinated work of local political institutions.

Key actors: It is of notional importance, who are the key actors that have impact on political regulations and outlining the state's strategic preferences. Meanwhile, the key actors can both improve or significantly

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[30] **Anten L., Briscoe I., Mezzera M.,** Op. cit.

[31] **Debiel T., Terlinden U.,** Promoting Good Governance in Post-Conflict Societies, Discussion paper, Technische Zusammenarbeit, GTZ, Eschborn, 2005.

[32] **Schedler A.,** Conceptualizing Accountability, *Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.) The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies,* Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1999.

[33] **Fritz V., Kaiser K., Levy B.,** Problem-Driven Governance and Political Economy Analysis, Good Practice Framework, World Bank, Washington D.C., 2009.

disrupt and destabilize the processes of post-conflict state-building and stateness. In the cases of states emerged after armed conflict power is focused in the hands of the actors, who, in their turn, control the armed groups, unless the Constitution and relevant laws haven't been adopted and the elections haven't been held on their basis[34]. Hence, in the first phase the key actors are the warlords, whose role in the second phase should gradually decrease, of course, if the process is moving in the right direction.

The opportunities and obstacles, that domestic elites face, shape the balance of power between competing actors and their capability to support the process of state-building and those processes, which would be conducive to them. International and regional processes may also have either supporting or hindering impact on the afore-mentioned processes – to which the local leaders and elites tend to respond[35]. At the same time the heavy internationalization of the state-building process has generated its own contradictions. The greater the international role, the stronger the internal tensions are likely to be. This casts the current effort to recreate Afghan political life in a very different light from what international and Afghan supporters of the state-building enterprise envisaged in the early years after the regime change in 2001[36].

Center-periphery relations: Political settlement also shapes the relations between the center and peripheries, and is in turn its result. It depends on what development "the rules of the game" tend to have, what degree of power centralization and decentralization is selected, which is largely determined by center's revenues and taxation capability from peripheries. In modern state-building and peace-building processes the following key issues can be determined: are the ethnic and sub-national political entities able to create a united national identity, domination patters, which characterize the relationship between the sub-national

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[34]**Goldstone J.,** Op. cit.

[35]**Morgan P.,** Some Findings on Donor Support to Capacity Development in Two Post-Conflict States, World Bank, Washington D.C., 2009.

[36] **Sukhre A.,** The Rule of Law in Afghanistan: Missing in Inaction, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011.

groups, their relations with the center, disputes over natural resources, etc[37].

The Effective Fulfillment of State's Basic Functions in the Post-Conflict Phase

States differ in their normative framework and sources of legitimacy. However, there are some basic functions, which are common to all sustainable and sustainability aspiring states. They are the following ones:

Ensuring security: Overall, without ensuring public security, the economy and public services simply cannot work and peace cannot be obtained. Bright examples are Somalia and Afghanistan. State should be able to protect itself from both internal and external threats, while simultaneously being obliged to protect the population – regardless of ethnicity. The balancing of power and liabilities is essential for strengthening the state's legitimacy, as well as for receiving citizens' support[38].

Effective distribution of state revenues and providing basic services: For funding the provision of the rule of law, security and other basic services*,* the state must be able to ensure revenues charge and distribute them – taking into account social expectations, which, in turn, requires a reliable and transparent system of public financial management, ability of tax levying and accountability mechanisms[39]. When the collected taxes are used for providing the public services, which meet the social expectations, then "reciprocity" relations are established between the government and the population[40]. Thus, the

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[37]**Migdal J.,** State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001.
[38]**Sisk T., Wyeth V.,** Rethinking Peace-Building and State-Building in War-Torn Countries: Conceptual Clarity, Policy Guidance, and Practical Implications, Draft discussion note for the OECD DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility, 2009.
[39]**Carnahan M., Lockhart C.,** Peace-Building and Public Finance in Charles T. Call with Vanessa Wyeth (eds.), Building States to Build Peace, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2008.
[40]**Moore M.,** Revenues, State Formation, and the Quality of Governance in Developing Countries, *International Political Science Review*, 2004, **25,** 3, 297-319.

population supports the government, and the government is keen to fulfill its obligations, as it depends on tax collection - necessary for state revenues, which ensure its existence and activity. If the direct link between tax collection and service delivery is absent, state legitimacy can be considerably affected[41].

However, in practice one may find a way discrepant cases: e.g. South Sudan possesses rich natural resources. Of pre-secession Sudan's 6.8 billion barrels of proven oil reserves (the 3rd largest in Sub-Saharan Africa), three quarters are in South Sudan, along with largely untapped deposits of gold and other minerals. Although 90% of the land is fertile, with half classified as prime agricultural land, only 1-2% is actually farmed. The state has also rich water resources and fish stocks. However, prevailing economic and social conditions make it difficult for the new state to mobilize resources for state-building and development. The overwhelming majority of the population remains stuck in subsistence farming, since access to markets is difficult and production too low to generate any significant surplus. Among livestock-herding communities, which are estimated to account for 50-60% of the South Sudanese population, commercial considerations are only very slowly taking root. The traditional understanding of cattle as primarily representing a source of social status and economic security is still predominant. The South Sudanese economy is only superficially integrated into markets and monetized exchange. Accordingly, there is limited potential for the state to raise taxes on markets and transactions[42].

Establishment of the rule of law: The states create conditions under which they can reinforce the security, increase the efficiency of public institutions and undertake other reforms – including effective control over the whole territory of the state. This function reflects state's ability to prevent and resolve conflicts, to ensure impartial, consistent and equal application of law, and to bring perpetrators and criminals to justice. Justice system is the key component of state-society relations and liability distribution. The rule of law must enable the society to take the

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[41] Service Delivery in Fragile Situations: Key Concepts, Findings and Lessons, OECD, Paris, 2008.
[42] **Lacher W.,** South Sudan: International State-Building and its Limits, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for and Security Affairs: 5-33.

advantage of justice mechanisms and be aware of their rights and responsibilities[43].

E,g, in Kosovo, the reforms to promote judicial independence have focused on three measures to shield the judiciary from political influence: the independence of the appointment process, the independence of the disciplinary process, and security of tenure for judges. The collapse of the justice system in Kosovo led to a huge backlog of cases that the nascent judiciary was ill-prepared to deal with. Even after the emergency judicial system was replaced with more institutionalized structures at the end of 1999, this backlog remained, and compromised the right of detainees to be tried without undue delay. Judicial effectiveness was limited further by the destruction of the physical court infrastructure and the lack of well-trained legal practitioners in Kosovo. Ten years of exclusion from the justice system and the exclusion of Albanian students from the law faculty meant that the training of many of them was insufficient or outdated, in particular with regard to international human rights law. In the absence of a full review of the applicable Yugoslav law and its compliance with international human rights standards, it was up to these judges to decide on the law in each case, which led to confusion about the applicable laws. UNMIK tried to address the problems of effectiveness and capacity in three ways: (*a*) internationalization of the judiciary; (*b*) reorganization of the judiciary; and (*c*) legal training for judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers. But what is interesting, in fact UNMIK has compromised Kosovar self-governance and ownership to enhance the effectiveness of the courts, and as a response to the failure of Kosovar judicial institutions to uphold human rights and the rule of law, in particular the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. However, as the case illustrates, UNMIK has not always succeeded in its aims: judicial independence has not always been protected, and the effectiveness of the judicial system continues to be undermined by the small number of judges and an increasing case load, despite greater internationalization of the judiciary[44]. But what is even more interesting, that after the end of the mission,

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[43]**Fritz V., Kaiser K., Levy B.,** Op. cit.
[44] **Zaum D.,** The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, 144-153.

Kosovo's judicial system didn't manage to continue UNMIK's designed orbit and year-by-year increased the registered regress. Nowadays it is one of the most vulnerable and corrupted fields, with judges which have been understaffed and unable to deal with an increasing load of cases.

Promotion of economic development: Political stability and social security have greater chances to be ensured under the conditions of economic growth and social development. Meanwhile, favorable conditions must be created for economic development by state institutions, which provide adequate infrastructure for investments, protection of right of property, regulatory framework for financial and economic transactions[45].

The efficiency of various state functions and service delivery depends on state-society relations and their constant cooperation. When one or more functions fail, it can have negative impact on the other state functions – increasing the fragility. The form and extent of the provision of these functions are an indivisible part of political processes, through which the interests of citizens and providers of political processes are coordinated.

The state that is able to fulfill the afore-mentioned functions is on its way to sustainability. Hence, the effective implementation of these functions can be viewed as an inevitable prerequisite for state-building. They can equally be expressed in one context as preconditions for social movement or political party, whereas in another one – as a purpose of development of state-society cooperation. In addition, these factors are inseparable part of social, political and economic expectations and political settlement, as they serve as an indicator of state's capability to effectively fulfill its functions and promptly respond to the problems. Suffice to note, that the exclusively technical fortification of the above-mentioned key state functions (police, judiciary, public financial management, etc.) is not enough. Their perception as a mere technical activity runs counter to the political basis of state-building – ignoring the threats and challenging the political interests, which have led to the existing "status quo".

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[45]**Fritz V., Rocha-Menocal A.,** Op. Cit.

Key actors: The difficulties that arise because of the limited public representation and capacities in fragile states occur at a time when the provision of key activities and services is focused in the hands of some non-state actors – including international and local nongovernmental organizations, inherited power holders and in some cases criminal or armed groups, who are challenging and competing with the legitimate authorities[46]. The activities and goals of resistance groups and non-state militias must also be understood against the backdrop of state recession, marginalization, agency, and the existence of complex, regionalized formal and informal networks and power structures. At the same time in the fragile entities the study should bear another angle too: especially in such entities the investigating agency on the part of non-state or informal actors is no less important for understanding the situation in a country than investigating the role of regime and economic elites. E.g. movement actors – political, social, economic or ideational – that do not want to work ''in the system'' are reflexively seen as threats, regardless of the merits of the system itself or whether the actors have violent intentions. But if the system has always neglected or exploited them, why is it reasonable to assume that they should want to work within it?[47]

Center-periphery relations: Fragile post-conflict states are likely to have limited authority over some regions within their own territory. As a rule, the process of state-building and afterwards stateness is more visible in the capital, whereas the population of the peripheries typically has a limited and insufficient interaction with the state. As a result, informal or regional authorities are more actively particpating in the management of these regions[48]. In such context, not only the traditional model of "top-down" state-building and governance is put under a risk, but also the threat of non-stability is increasing. In the terms of absence or underdevelopment of international and local control mechanisms over the state, the formal authorities also experience lack of oversight over their own territory, which in its turn is more than a prolific basis for the

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[46]**Batley R., Mcloughlin C.,** Engagement with Non-State Service Providers in Fragile States: Reconciling State-Building and Service Delivery, *Development Policy Review*, 2010, **28,** 2, 131-154.

[47] **Boas M., Jennings K.,** Insecurity and Development: The Rhetoric of the 'Failed States', *The European Journal of Development Research*, 2005, **17**, 3, 385-395.

[48]**Migdal J.,** Op. cit.

emergence and development of illegal groups and activities. At the same time, it's worth mentioning, that even the existence of international control and administration mechanisms isn't yet a guaranty for stability. Even UN, OSCE, EU and NATO efforts weren't sufficient to make Kosovo, located in the centre of Europe – the cradle of democracy, to retrain from being cradle of illicit activities like illegal arms trade, drugs, trafficking.

Another bright example can be found in another continent-Africa. At the end of colonial rule, most African countries did not face serious (external) security threats. The pressure to build an effective state apparatus capable of exerting control beyond the center and/or to mobilize revenue through efficient administration was therefore much lower). Geography helped to exacerbate this situation: low population density and difficult terrain made it too costly for leaders to try to impose their authority outside the capital. Thus, the need to build legitimacy and make compromises with the domestic population (through direct taxation, infrastructure linking different parts of the country, etc.) was almost entirely missing[49].

Social Expectations in the Post-Conflict Environment

A sustainable state must be able to meet the social expectations[50]. Depending on how the society perceives the state's functions, two types of social expectations can be distinguished: normative and realistic. Normative expectations are based on beliefs and perceptions of norm-making institutions on what the state should look like, what services it should deliver and how it should treat the society. The latter depends on how the legitimacy affects state-society relations. These expectations are above all the combination result of political competition, ideologies and beliefs. The realistic expectations refer to what services the society actually expects the state to deliver. Realistic and normative expectations differ from state to state: the citizens can get disappointed of both the government itself and state's rapid response capabilities, and the "degree of disappointment" varies in each particular case. However, there exist

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[49] **Fritz V., Rocha-Menocal A.,** Op. Cit.
[50] Service Delivery…, Op.cit.

additional difficulties in fragile states, as the society tends to: a.) have little expectations from the state in terms of service delivery (particularly, conditioned by its inability), b.) consider the state as a source of repression and elite's "privatized" domain. The disparity between normative and realistic expectations can contribute to the distortion of perceptions and relevant patterns among various stakeholders. But what matters above all is undoubtedly the legitimacy of state-society relations[51].

Social expectations on state-society relations are also outlined through the changes in political voice and top-down social mobilization. No matter how effectively any type of positive changes and amendments are implemented, the political voice is formed not only through political processes, but also by the mobilization possibilities of society, especially - civil society. Where the society is fragmented by conflicts and violence, the possibilities for political voice and social accountability are often eroded. A matter of special concern are the issues of mobilization capabilities of vulnerable and marginalized groups, especially in post-conflict entities. In post-conflict fragile states the continuous disregard of fundamental rights, including the violation of children's rights, gender inequalities and the systematic expulsion of indigenous peoples and vulnerable minority groups, is largely conditioned by the absence of voting rights and legal channels for participation[52].

And finally the situation gets even more aggravated for the states emerged on the right of peoples to self-determination, as here the social expectations are extremely versatile and polarized. This partially impacts on the issues of social cohesion, that are encountered in the states, which unequally provide public services. In fact, whatever origin these issues have, still the crucial is that the common civic consciousness is missing and the political settlement has not succeeded in acquisition of even temporary agreement on various normative views about social cooperation. Under such conditions it is essential that the foreign impact and/or support in carrying out reforms and implementing changes would

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[51] Do No Harm: International Support to Statebuilding, OECD DAC, Paris, 2010.
[52] **Migdal J.,** Op. cit.

be consciously tempered, so as to avoid excessive social expectations, which often happens in the case of the fragile states[53].

Key actors: The key actors include those political elites, which have different political views and preferences. Under democratic regimes these are the political parties. In the states emerged on the right of peoples to self-determination among the political elite one may find both legal and illegal elements – including individuals and groups engaged in organized crime and corruption[54]. In such settings the political parties are getting support from elite structures or individuals/organizations seeking exclusively economic profit. At the same time non-governmental or civic organizations can appear as key actors to the prompt and effective support of state-building process. However, warlords or criminal groups may with equal success appear as informal actors[55].

Some fragile states, especially post-conflict ones – in terms of their incapability to govern their state - have to turn to foreign extensive aid (international administration). Within these circumstances the role of external key actors becomes an issue of special concern. Three major issues can be singled out here. First, in the absence of clear rules governing their conduct, international officials find themselves endowed with more or less absolute power. It is not clear whether they are legally bound by international human rights instruments, as states that are parties to those instruments are.

Second, it is not clear to whom and how they are accountable. In the case of UN administrations, they report to the Secretary-general, who in turn reports to the Security Council, usually at three-month or six-month intervals. The Council does not really have any mechanism, and its members seldom have much appetite, for scrutinizing the conduct of an administration in detail. As for the administered, they have little recourse unless they can reach the media and public opinion of influential member states. If they are learning to govern themselves democratically,

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[53]Ibid.

[54]**Sisk T., Wyeth V.,** Rethinking Peace-Building and State-Building in War-Torn Countries: Conceptual Clarity, Policy Guidance, and Practical Implications, Draft discussion note for the OECD DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility, 2009.

[55] Armed Violence …, Op. cit.

it is not exactly by example. These are not minor concerns; they are fundamental.

Third and the most cumbersome one in terms of social expectations - their knowledge and understanding of the populations they are administering is often superficial, at best. They have to deal with what is *ex hypothesi* in an emergency situation, where the first priority is to ensure public order and safety in populations that may be divided by intense mutual hostility, and this has often been fanned by "hate media". As a result, they may feel entitled, even compelled, to act in an authoritarian or arbitrary way, and they may consider that giving power to representatives of the local population, however desirable in the long term, is a recipe for disaster in the short term[56]. International actors wishing to stimulate a transformation of the state need to be aware of, and integrate into their plans, an in-depth understanding of its history, existing power relations, vested interests and the socio-political rules of the game. Should these be lacking, the risks entailed include the inhibition of local political elites' sense of responsibility and development of their capacities, an eternal blame game as seen in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and a weakened local ability to forge a social contract[57]. Another example is found in Afghanistan, where the near-complete dependence on foreign, mainly US and EU, funds for salaries, training and equipment raises questions about who commands the Afghan armed forces and whose interests it serves. In this situation, the armed forces can serve as a tool of Afghan state-building only when Afghan interests coincide with the interests of the foreign patrons, but not as an instrument of autonomy[58].

Center-periphery relations: In semi-consolidated democratic regimes the social expectations on state-society relations are extremely different and contradictory. It might be further displayed by political and geographical fragmentation between the center and peripheries and

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[56] **Mortimer E.,** International Administration of War-Torn Societies, *Global Governance*, 2001, **1,** 1, 7-14.

[57] **Monatanaro L.,** The Kosovo Statebuilding Conundrum: Addressing Fragility in a Contested State, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), 2009.

[58] **Sukhre A.,** Op. cit.

formation of monopolies for social and political actors[59]. The main challenge of state-building lies in the efficiency of ensuring compliance within multiple levels of state-society relations and diverse expectations from the government[60].

Legitimacy Issues of Post-Conflict States

Legitimacy is of pivotal importance for state-society relations. Legitimacy ensures the basis of power exercise by consent rather than compulsion. The lack of it undoubtedly contributes to state fragility, as it disrupts state-society relations and questions the political elite's future. Legitimacy should be consistent with society's beliefs on law and justice, their underlying values and norms. It should also correspond to the legal correlation between electorate, elite and leadership institutions, which shape the political power. The latter is legitimate, if a) it is derived from the people and is exercised in accordance with majority's consent (the state power-holder is elected by the people for a certain period, hence can/should be monitored by them); b) state power is exercised in accordance with the constitutional principles[61].

Understanding the interaction of sources and levels of legitimacy is utmost for effective state-building process. There are five major sources of legitimacy, which have diverse manifestation in political, social and other context.

- Input (process) legitimacy refers to the maintenance of the established procedure, under which the government adopts binding decisions and ensures citizens' participation. Under democratic regimes this procedure is enshrined in the constitution and suggests competitive elections, law-abiding governance and criminal liability mechanisms – in cases of law violations[62]. Input

[59] **Rocha-Menocal A., Fritz V.,** Hybrid Regimes and the Challenges of Deepening and Sustaining Democracy in Developing Countries, *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 2008, **15**, 1, 29-40.

[60] **Migdal J.,** Op. cit.

[61] The Legitimacy of the State in Fragile Situation, OECD DAC, Paris, 2010.

[62] **Scharpf F.,** Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999.

legitimacy is also based on prevailing values within the society, customary law and practice[63].

- Output (performance) legitimacy is based on the perceptions about the effectiveness of state performance and the quality of services delivered[64]. The ability to ensure security and economic development, to deliver the basic social services and to shape mechanisms promoting economic development and employment is of fundamental importance[65].

- Throughput legitimacy implies the policy-making processes, through which the decisions are transformed from input (process) to output (performance). This includes not only effective and transparent decision-making process, but also intermediation processes, through which the citizens qua interests as opposed to qua voters have an influence. As a result, throughput legitimacy through interest-based intermediation and consultation with the people represents a way in which minority interests can gain a voice even without a majority vote[66].

- Shared beliefs on what public authorities should be - shaped by tradition, historical events and structures of socialization (including ethnicity, culture, religion, etc.)[67]. Legitimacy based on leader's charisma may also be added to the beliefs, which shape legitimacy[68].

- International legitimacy implies the recognition of state's sovereignty and the elected government by the external actors[69].

Three levels of legitimacy can be distinguished: state legitimacy, elite's legitimacy and regional authorities' legitimacy. The first is directly related to state's international recognition and the lack of it almost automatically leads to the non-recognition of the second and the third.

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[63] The Legitimacy …, Op. cit.
[64] **Schmidt V.,** Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and "Throughput", *Political Studies*, 2013, **61**, 1, 2–22.
[65] The Legitimacy…, Op. cit.
[66] **Schmidt V.,** Op. cit.
[67] The Legitimacy…, Op. cit.
[68] **Weber M.,** The three types of legitimate rule. *Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions*, 1958, **4**, 1, 1-11.
[69] The Legitimacy…, Op. cit.

This doesn't derive from the international law, but it is an implicitly implemented approach within the international organizations' and recognized states' practice[70].

The perception of the linkage between legitimacy and state capabilities is fundamental for the state-building process and the development of political settlement. The society's perceptions on legitimacy are crucial in terms of willingness to cooperate with the government and to accept its "right to rule". Legitimacy, in turn, increases state's opportunities and capabilities, as the state can rely upon mainly non-coercive power: citizens can get motivated to mobilize and engage in collective or individual activity, which is in fact citizens' responsiveness towards the state. Citizens' responsiveness allows the state to more effectively evaluate its interests and use its capabilities, as well as develop and implement a policy, which would promote the citizens' needs, goals and interests. Thus, state capabilities and legitimacy are mutually reinforcing and can establish either effective, or non-effective (states under fragility risk) institutions[71]. Thus, state-building implies the cumbersome process of interaction and balancing between the shared beliefs on various sources of legitimacy and state-society relations and public authorities.

Legitimacy has key role in each stage of state-building. It ensures the transition from purely coercive governance to the highest (legitimate) authority for the society, which would be authorized to adopt and effectively implement binding decisions. Alongside to the expansion of state-building process the concept of legitimacy gains even more crucial role in the process of building state-society relations, which can either positively or negatively affect the negotiations process on conflict management, production and distribution of resources and consumer goods[72].

A very interesting case for studying post-conflict legitimacy issues can be Kosovo. Kosovo today remains a low-income post-conflict

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[70] **Torosyan T.,** Op. cit.
[71] **Papagianni K.,** Participation and State Legitimation in Charles T. Call with Vanessa Wyeth (eds.), Building States to Build Peace, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2008.
[72] **Whaites A.,** States in Development: Understanding State-Building, Working Paper, DFID, London, 2008.

country characterized by weak institutional capacity and state legitimacy, lacking control of the whole national territory; without monopoly on the use of force, and an inability to provide core functions and basic services to citizens. Senior international governance officials consider that the dysfunctionalities of the state are due to it being 'young and inexperienced'. International actors continue to work on the hypothesis that the fragilities of the Kosovar state are part of a transitional process that will gradually improve towards a Westphalian model. But the extensive externally-led administrative and security intervention that has been mounted in the last decade has not generated genuine state legitimacy nor created institutional strength. Indeed, external efforts have failed to address the underlying causes of conflict and state weakness, and may have even undermined state construction in a number of critical ways. The normative pluralism in Kosovo, featuring conflicting models of social and political organization and legitimacy, has resulted in a widespread perception of a gap between the legal and the legitimate. There is little sense of the ultimate rules of the game which structure society, providing an overall social and cultural framework[73].

Key actors: In the states, where the state institutions haven't still been fully established, the non-state actors – e.g. warlords, rebels and criminal networks – can take the advantage of lack of state capacity and legitimacy, and offer alternative governance systems. Therefore, the issue of legitimacy is very complex in fragile entities - with different sources of legitimacy coexisting, competing and conflicting and interacting with other sources of power and interest. This further complicates external actors' effective intervention to state-building process[74].

What if to the afore-named problems to add the fact, that very often in post-conflict entities the top-down models fail, if they clash and do not comply with the local perceptions about what constitutes legitimate public authority. This, in turn, presents a number of substantial dilemmas: e.g. the external actors are committed to supporting post-conflict state-building that is in keeping with international human rights norms or rational-legal notions of legal accountability, but these might

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[73] **Monatanaro L.,** Op. cit.
[74]**Paris R., Sisk T.,** The Contradictions of State Building: Confronting the Dilemmas of Post-War Peace Operations, Routledge, London, 2008.

not match local beliefs and traditions about how power is best exercised[75].

   Center-periphery relations: It is also noteworthy that various sources of legitimacy interact and sometimes even compete with one another. In particular, when it comes to religion, culture and traditions, the normative beliefs can significantly differ across the various regions of the state. And where the sources of legitimacy collide, the opportunities for large-scale agreement between the citizens (within rights and duties) and the state tend to eliminate.

Conclusion

   The analysis of historical and structural legacies of state-building, the issues of state-building in new global environment, as well as the main factors conditioning state-building and their features in post-conflict environment shows that:

- The post-conflict state-building of the states emerged on the right of peoples to self-determination should be based on the efficient functioning of political, economic and social institutions. Especially in the case of these states the pre-conflict legacies, the peculiarities of conflict phase and new factors, such as the arising problems and challenges for the newly established government, require special attention.

- Simultaneously evolving and interconnected internal and external transition processes can aggravate the post-conflict settlement. The enforcement of peace and security and the effective state-building process depend on the precise management of the transition processes.

- In new global environment deliberately greater attention is paid to state-building process, which can either stipulate, or hinder the state-building process. The challenges, which arise in the non-recognized states because of stringent limitation of state representation and capacities, are more likely to emerge, when

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[75] The Legitimacy…, Op. cit.

political settlement and key functions are focused in the hands of some representatives of informal structures.

- The conditions and challenges of the contemporary world have their profound impact on the post-conflict and yet non-recognized states. Suffice to note, that this impact is mainly negative: foreign aid dependency, the rents received from the export of illicit goods, the modern structures of international finance facilitating the withdrawal of the capital from the state, as well as the thriving global market of military and security services.

- For the post-conflict and yet non-recognized states the enforcement of peace and security is not merely one of the state's basic functions, but daily fatal necessity. However, the process of extensive and intensive armament is expensive and at the same time encounters the problem of unceasing equipment upgrade, which is very troublesome in the conditions of limited international relations. What to say about the cases, when it accrues with large-scale expenses on the reconstruction of infrastructure and becomes a real challenge for economic development.

- In the non-recognized states the lack of experience of building sovereign statehood significantly complicates the synthesis process of formal and informal norms and practices. The issue is also hindered by the fact, that in the states emerged after an armed conflict the power is focused in the hands of the leaders of armed groups, which should be transferred to legal authorities after the adoption of constitution, relevant laws and decent elections administered on their basis, if the process moves in the right direction. However, as a rule, the leaders of that groups are not willing to forward the power.

- In post-conflict environment both normative and realistic social expectations are quite limited: as a rule the society views the state as "incapable" or elite's "privatized" domain. The continuous violation of human rights and the systematic expulsion of vulnerable groups (especially ethnic minorities, bright examples is Kosovo) do not contribute to the improvement of the situation.

- In post-conflict phase the state-building process is more visible in the center (the capital), whereas the population of the peripheries as a rule has a limited interaction with the central government. But the afore-mentioned is only the "top of the iceberg", as the issue is actually even more complicated: very often some informal and regional authorities have more active participation in the governance process of these regions than the official state institutions. And, although the central government manages to retain its power by using the authority of the local leaders over the rural areas, but that situation has significant negative impact, becoming a generator of poverty and vulnerability for the population of that region.

- Fragility, conflict and violence may exist simultaneously – serving as both cause and result for each others' existence. Hence, the state-building often develops alongside with peace-building, where both processes can bear the impact of both external and internal (including the developing society) actors.

- The study of the features of post-conflict state-building needs further practical analysis. Suffice to note, that there exist yet non-recognized post-conflict states, which successfully cope with the afore-mentioned challenges (e.g. Artsakh). Whereas the others do not manage to continue the processes of state-building and stateness after the removal of the international mission – spanning the state to fragility and/or failure (e.g. Kosovo).