
NEW WORLD ORDER: REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

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**Turkey's Modern Foreign Policy:
New Challenges and New Opportunities**

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The article analyzes the prerequisites, objectives and theoretical bases of the essential changes taking place in Turkey's foreign policy after the collapse of bipolar world order. It demonstrates the similarities and differences between "Neo-Ottomanism" ideology and "Strategic Depth" doctrine, both serving as the theoretical basis of Turkish foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party. The article reveals the state and prospects of the compliance of current foreign policy objectives with their implementation results in the context of geopolitical rivalry. The analysis of current foreign policy demonstrates that it does not fully correspond to either the "Strategic Depth" doctrine or the "Neo-Ottomanism" ideology, but is in line with the situational tactics used by Qemal Ataturk. Hence, regardless of significant prospects for the improvement of Turkey's positions in the event of gas reserves transits from the South Caucasus and the Middle East to Europe, serious challenges and problems are still outlined on that path.

Keywords

Turkey, foreign policy, Neo-Ottomanism, "Strategic Depth" doctrine, Middle East, South Caucasus, geopolitical rivalry

Need for the Changes in Turkey's Foreign Policy after Collapse of the USSR

In the 1980s it became apparent that though after the fall of the Ottoman Empire Turkey had managed to retain a number of territories and to overcome an array of complex challenges due to Kemal Ataturk, a number of domestic (the development level of Eastern regions, the Kurdish question, huge political influence of the military elite, substantial changes in the structure and consciousness of society, etc) and foreign policy issues (the absence of a real prospect for EU integration¹, the absence of regional cooperation, complicated relations with neighbouring countries, the status of the US policy adherent in the region, problems connected with the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, etc) required entirely new ideas and approaches to ensure a favourable environment for further development of domestic and foreign policy. The collapse of the Soviet Union carried double significance in terms of the challenges Turkey had to face. On the one hand, it significantly weakened Turkey's role as the US major partner at the Southern borders of the USSR, on the other, the entirely new geopolitical situation and the new power vacuum in the region resulted from the collapse of bipolar world order and elimination of the second pole theoretically created unlimited possibilities for Turkey. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Turkey demonstrated unprecedented activeness in terms of suggesting new ideas on the radical revision of its domestic and foreign policy, as well as on their implementation practice.

T. Ozal, Prime Minister in 1983-1989, and the winner of the 1989 presidential elections, initiated drastic changes in Turkey's both domestic and foreign policy². He was the first Turkish statesman who challenged the effectiveness of foreign policy principles adopted under K. Ataturk, and attempted to lay an alternative pathway for Turkey³. He offered significant changes in domestic and foreign policy. In both cases an attempt has been made to reconsider the role of Islam. Having established close ties with "Naqshbandi" religious brotherhood, T. Ozal sought to

¹ **Sayari S.**, Turkey: The Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis, *Middle East Journal*, **46**, 1, Winter, 1992, 9-21

² **Anderson P.**, After Kemal, *London Review of Books*, **30**, 18, 25 September, 2008, 17-18.

³ **Ataman M.**, Leadership change: Özal Leadership and Restructuring in Turkish Foreign Policy,- *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, **1**, 1, Spring, 2002, 120-153.

weaken the impact of Kemalism and atheistic policy, meanwhile trying to represent Islam as an essential and necessary component of Turkish identity⁴. In Turkish academic circles Ozal's "Turkish Islam" is viewed as more moderate and more compatible with liberalism and democracy than the Iranian or Arabic Islam⁵. Ozal also believed the consensus between different identities in Turkey to be an important step in the improvement of domestic policy⁶. He attached great importance to Islam in the scope of foreign relations as well. Unlike Kemalism which viewed Turkey as a secular European state isolating it from the Muslim world, Ozal's policy implied active relations with Muslims in the Balkans, Middle East and Caucasus, i.e. the former Ottoman territories. Certainly, the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia turned to be important incentive on this path. Following these events Turkey was finally capable to establish direct relations with Turkic-speaking Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan⁷, Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania which rejected to follow the communist regime. Moreover, Ozal highlighted the economic and cultural components of these relations denying any aggressive or expansionist aspirations. Even though Ozal never described his principles as "Neo-Ottomanism" as A. Davutoglu, the major theorist of this policy, did later, in 2000's, Turkish academic circles apply the definition "Neo-Ottomanism" for both cases⁸. Nevertheless, Ozal's "neo-Ottomanism" ideas eventually failed as they were strongly revolutionary for Turkey in that particular period, and did not receive significant political support. The discontent among the military elite did not turn into the tradition-like revolution only because of T. Ozal's unexpected death, in autumn 1993. It seemed that the election of President Suleyman Demirel, an active proponent of Kemalist

⁴ **Gunter M. M.**, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds (Historical Dictionaries of Peoples and Cultures), Scarecrow Press, 2010, 224.

⁵ **Laçiner S.**, Ozalism (Neo-Ottomanism): An Alternative in Turkish Foreign Policy?, *Yonetim Bilimleri Dergisi* (1:1-2), *Journal of Administrative Sciences*, 2003-2004, 167-181.

⁶ **Taşpınar Ö.**, The three strategic visions of Turkey, available at <http://acturca.wordpress.com/2011/03/08/three-strategic-visions/> (11.02.2015).

⁷ **Fuller G.**, Turkey Faces East: New Orientations toward the Middle East and the Old Soviet Union, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1997, 37-39.

⁸ **Laçiner S.**, Op. cit.

ideology, put an end to the era of “Neo-Ottomanism”, however new geopolitical reality dictated the maintenance of the objectives behind Ozal’s “Turkic world” in the core of Turkey’s foreign policy⁹. Turkey’s Prime Minister S. Demirel, during his visit to newly independent Turkic states, announced¹⁰ that a new Turkic world had emerged and a new map was taking shape, five new flags with crescents had been added to Turkey’s flag, and the “gigantic Turkic world” would stretch from the Adriatic to the China Sea. Turkey was trying to return and get back whatever it lost a hundred years ago; however a few years were enough to ascertain that Moscow would not allow the extension of Turkey’s influence over the East¹¹. Interesting enough, a century ago Turkey promised Russia to become the torchbearer of communism in the East in return receiving substantial financial and military support which enabled to preserve Turkey’s current territory and vitality; similarly, after the collapse of the USSR it promised the same to the West, this time regarding the Westernization of the East. Even its theoretical bases have been worked out – to implement the “Turkish model”¹² of forming secular states under democratic regime in Muslim-majority countries. This sought to eliminate the Russian and Iranian influences in Central Asia and neighbouring countries. Obviously, the success of the “Turkish model” of democracy in the former Muslim Republics of the Soviet Union was as hard to think of as it was difficult to picture the establishment of the “Turkish Communism” in the East a century ago. Making sure that it lacks the potential necessary for both the establishment of the “Turkic world” and geopolitical struggle, Turkey had to give up its own “big game”, to regain its strategic importance as well as to benefit from its valued role in others’ (United States, Russia,

⁹ **Naegle J.**, Turkey: Foreign Policy Objectives- Part Two, RFE/RL, 13.08.1998, available at www.binfo.com/places/Bulgaria/news/98-08/aug13b.rfe; *Turkish Daily News*, 05.06.1992.

¹⁰ **Pipes D.**, *The Event of Our Era*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994, 16; **Winrow M. G.**, Turkey’s Relations With the Transcaucasus and the Central Asian Republics, *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, March-May, 1996, 131-146.

¹¹ **Torosyan T.**, The Return of Turkey, *Russia in Global Affairs*, 3, July-September, 2009, 120-129.

¹² **Bal I.**, The Turkish Model and Turkic Republics. *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, III, 3, September-November 1998.

EU) strategic plans using the influence it has in the region¹³. It is noteworthy that the establishment of the religious-oriented foreign relations encompassing the former territories of the Ottoman Empire has been common not only in Ozal's and Demirel's perceptions of foreign policy, but also in that of all more or less influential Turkish political forces – from the Pan-Turkic Nationalist Movement Party to the proponents of Modernization (Westernization)¹⁴. Moreover, Turkey's academic circles, most likely under the strong influence of the fall of the bipolar world order, also held a common view in terms of theoretical bases of foreign policy. They are based on classical geopolitical approaches put forward by the Western authors, particularly that of Central Eurasia proposed by Mackinder. Other works promote other concepts ranging from R. Özey's monograph "Turkic World in Global Arena"¹⁵ and his "Center Domination by Turks" concept according to which Anatolia is the "World Fortress" and possessing it Turkey gains an opportunity to control the Balkans and Eurasia – to Davutoğlu's "Strategic Depth" doctrine, which later became the theoretical basis of Turkey's foreign policy¹⁶.

The Theoretical Basis of Turkish Modern Foreign Policy: "Neo-Ottomanism" or "Strategic Depth"

After the win of Justice and Development party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) in the 2002 parliamentary elections, A. Davutoğlu's "Strategic Depth" doctrine became the theoretical basis of Turkey's foreign policy. The author of the doctrine began his activity in the government sector as an advisor to Prime-Minister R. T. Erdoğan, then served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Later, after Erdoğan won the presidential elections, he was appointed Turkey's Prime Minister. Meanwhile, it should be noted that he does not use the term "Neo-Ottomanism" to characterize Turkey's policy during the AKP's rule. As a

¹³ **Oran B.**, *The Turkish Approach to Transcaucasia and Central Asia*, Ole Hoiris and Sefa Martin Yürükel, eds., *Contrasts and solutions in the Caucasus*, Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1998, 462.

¹⁴ **Oran B.**, *Op. cit.*

¹⁵ **Özey R.**, *Dünya Platformunda Türk dünyası*, İstanbul, 1999, 22-23.

¹⁶ **Davutoğlu A.**, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, İstanbul, 2001.

man who moved from academic life to politics, he acknowledges quite well that the positive attitude Turkish authorities hold towards that expression could hinder the progressive relations with the states formerly under the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, though a century has passed since its collapse, the reputation of the Ottoman Empire that treated its subjects in the most brutal way is still preserved. It is no coincidence that having in mind the rejection of “Neo-Ottomanism” ideology, A. Davutoglu puts forward the following argument: “The Turkish Republic is a modern nation state, and it has an equal status with the other countries in the region. We can build diplomatic relations with any big or small country which was previously under the Ottoman Empire”¹⁷. A few years later, readdressing this issue, A. Davutoglu sought to justify his position more firmly: “Certain circles accuse us of pursuing a neo-Ottoman agenda. These allegations are baseless. Common geography and historical relations with the region certainly dictate Turkey to follow an active policy in the face of developments in the region. Turkey simply looks for the establishment of security, peace, and stability on the basis of democracy in the region. Turkey has no hidden agenda toward the region. The key word defining Turkey’s relations with the Arab countries is not “hegemony”, but “mutual cooperation”. Therefore such fears are baseless”¹⁸. However, one of the two major ideas behind that policy is the fact of being the successor of the Ottoman Empire. According to A. Davutoglu, the role and value of each state in world politics is determined by its geographic location and history¹⁹. He believes that in this respect Turkey is in a privileged position, since it has a favorable geographical location, and it is the successor of the Ottoman Empire. Davutoglu attaches great importance to the establishment of ties with the countries of the Balkans, the Middle East, Central Asia, South Caucasus, the Mediterranean Sea, the Caspian and Black Sea basins, i.e. the former territories of the

¹⁷ A. Davutoglu: I am not a neottoman, *Today’s Zaman*, available at <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-193944-i-am-not-a-neo-ottoman-davutoglu-says.html> (14.01.2015).

¹⁸ Interview by Ahmet Davutoglu published in AUC Cairo Review (Egypt) on Mar. 12 2012, available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/interview-by-mr_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-published-in-auc-cairo-review-_egypt_-on-12-march-2012.en.mfa (14.01.2015).

¹⁹ **Davutoğlu A.**, *Stratejik ...*, Op. cit., p. 118.

Ottoman Empire. He believes that Turkey should not depend on any single power but should strive for balanced relations and alliances. According to Davutoglu, Turkey should play an active role in the regions formerly under the Ottoman Empire²⁰. To determine whether the policy Turkey has been pursuing over the last decade and a half can be named “Neo-Ottomanism”, it is necessary to compare the characteristics of that ideology, as described by academic circles with Davutoglu’s approaches based on his “Strategic Depth” monograph, as well as with the basic manifestations of implemented policy. According to Murinson, the core ideas of “Neo-Ottomanism” can be traced in Islam and Turkey’s imperial history as foreign policy guidelines resulting in the rejection of country’s secular Kemalist legacy and republican diplomacy tradition²¹. In his monograph, Davutoglu, too, stresses the necessity of revising Turkey’s foreign policy: “In recent decades Turkey has wasted crucial efforts and time in conflicts with its neighbours. For Turkey to become a regional leader and play a global strategic role, it needs to establish cordial relations with its neighbours”²².

The assessments of “Neo-Ottomanism”, provided by Turkish politicians, are rather close to Davutoglu’s vision built upon “Strategic Depth”. Taspinar underlines three major factors of this ideology:

1. to reach consensus within the country and with the Muslim world; to refrain from pursuing imperialist-like policy towards the countries of the Middle East, North Africa and the Balkans; to spread “Neo-Ottomanism” ideology through “soft” and balancing policy in countries formerly under the Ottoman Empire;
2. to pursue a more active diplomatic and economic policy to become a key regional player;
3. to deprive from the West whatever is Muslim: Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo and even Christian-majority Macedonia and Bulgaria

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ **Murinson A.**, *Turkish Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century*, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No 97, 2012, 920.

²² **Grigoriadis I.**, *The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy*, -ELIAMEP, Working Paper No. 8/2010, Greece, 5.

(considering the existence of Muslim population in these countries)²³.

Meanwhile, Davutoglu's doctrine of "Strategic Depth" proposes building a policy based on five principles:

1. preservation of balance between democracy and security;
2. adoption of the "zero problems with neighbours" policy considering the necessity of conflict resolution and establishment of friendly relations with the neighbouring countries;
3. establishment of progressive and stable relations with the neighbouring regions, the necessity for the establishment and development of economic cooperation regionally and globally;
4. adherence to a multi-dimensional foreign policy;
5. adoption of "soft power" policy²⁴

The ultimate goal of the afore-mentioned is to make Turkey a global political player²⁵.

The comparison between the factors on "Neo-Ottomanism" mentioned by Taspınar and the principles of "Strategic Depth" doctrine proposed by Davutoglu shows that regardless of different formats, both practically share the same content. Davutoglu's first principle coincides with the first part of Taspınar's first principle, second principle – with the second part of the first principle, third – with first and second factors, fourth – first and third factors, fifth – the last statement of the first factor. Though Davutoglu – the author of "Strategic Depth" – is unwilling to notice these similarities, obviously, they are so many that "Strategic depth" theory can even be regarded as a variety of "Neo-Ottomanism".

From Theory to Practice: Justification of Monitoring Framework

²³ **Taspınar Ö.**, Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalist foreign policy, available at <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/columnists-153882-neo-ottomanism-and-kemalist-foreign-policy.html> (17.12.2014).

²⁴ **Davutoğlu A.**, Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007, *Insight Turkey*, 10, 1, 2008, 79-83; Policy of Zero Problems with Our Neighbors, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/policy-of-zero-problems-with-our-neighbors.en.mfa> (01.02.2015)

²⁵ **Joshua W.**, Turkey's Imperial Legacy: Understanding Contemporary Turkey through its Ottoman Past, *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology*, 8, 2-3, 2009, 498-505.

The extent to which the above-mentioned theories are applied in Turkey's foreign policy and the results they lead to are of particular interest in the framework of comparative analysis between “Strategic Depth” doctrine and “Neo-Ottomanism” ideology. Since it was demonstrated that they share significant commonalities, the problem can be observed within either the five principles of “Strategic Depth” or the three factors of “Neo-Ottomanism”. An attempt has been made below to solve this problem in the pretext of the five principles.

First, it is necessary to replace the general theoretical format regarding the five principles with an applied scheme. The compliance chart below is based on Turkey's foreign policy priorities and its main trends under the AKP’s rule.

Table

	General principles of “Strategic Depth” doctrine	Format of applied policy
1.	Preservation of balance between democracy and security	Fulfilment of commitments of EU membership
2.	“Zero problems with neighbours” policy*	Relations with Armenia, Georgia, Syria, Cyprus, Iran, Iraq and Israel
3.	Progressive and stable relations in neighbouring regions*	South Caucasus, Middle East, Balkans, Black Sea and Caspian Sea basins
4.	Multi-dimensional foreign policy	Great powers: the US, the EU, and Russia

* These principles of “Strategic Depth” doctrine should be observed in the context of the first factor of Taspinar’s “Neo-Ottomanism”, i.e. “to reach consensus with the Muslim world”

The fifth principle is left out of the table for it shows neither the field nor the purpose of the activity, but merely its form. The table shows that Ankara's foreign policy covers those regions which the most active struggle broke out in for the redistribution of zones of influence and the

establishment of new world order following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the regions covering this area are either rich in energy reserves or serve as transit routes for energy supply. Hence, to give a full and brief description of the compliance of Turkey's foreign policy outcomes with the principles above, it becomes necessary to discuss the manifestation of geopolitical rivalry in the afore-mentioned regions, particularly in the Middle East and South Caucasus. Moreover, the starting point of that struggle's escalation between the key actors (US, Russia, EU) in the South Caucasus can be considered the Russian-Georgian War of 2008.

Geopolitical Rivalry: Results and Prospects

Observations on the results and prospects of Ankara's policy in the framework of geopolitical rivalry can be limited to the first three regions mentioned in the table since part of the countries of the Black and Caspian Sea basins either have a direct relationship with the first two regions or indirectly participate in the ongoing processes that will be discussed below. It should be noted that in the Balkans this rivalry ended in the late 1990's with the establishment of full Western superiority, while in the remaining two regions the struggle has been exacerbated. This is probably the prior reason for Ankara's achievements registered in the Balkans rather than in the Middle East or South Caucasus. In 2000-2008 Turkey's foreign trade with the Balkan countries reached from 2.9 billion USD up to 17.7 billion USD²⁶. Among the factors contributing to Turkey's diplomatic success in that region it is noteworthy to mention the trilateral meeting between the Presidents of Turkey, Serbia and H. Silajdzic, the then Chairman of the BiH Presidential Council. It resulted in the restoration of diplomatic relations between these two Balkan countries.

Though Ankara did not play a significant role in the ongoing geopolitical rivalry in the South Caucasus, it tried to benefit from the regional developments. Regardless of not being a participant of the Five-Day War, during the War and its aftermath Turkey took active steps

²⁶ **Türbedar E.**, Turkey's New Activism in Western Balkans: Ambitions and Obstacles, *Insight Turkey*, **13**, 3, 2011, 139-158.

which were regarded as the first signs towards multilateral foreign policy. Those steps were in line with Davutoğlu's vision regarding Turkey's capacity of pursuing multi-dimensional foreign policy²⁷, and the necessity of adopting more balanced position instead of implicitly backing the US²⁸. First, during the Five-Day War, Turkey did not allow American warships to deliver aid to the US-backed Georgia through the Turkish straits. Second, Turkey's Prime-Minister R. T. Erdogan, during his visit to Moscow a few days after the ceasefire, proposed Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform with the participation of South Caucasus countries as well as Russia and Turkey. Not only did Turkey exclude Washington's participation in the project but, had not even discussed that issue with the United States in advance. In the scope of Russia-US geopolitical struggle, Ankara's third and more impressive choice in favor of Moscow was registered in 2014, i.e. in the upsurge of that struggle. Following the sharp escalation of the situation in Ukraine, then its turn into armed clashes, the EU imposed sanctions against Russia under the intense pressure of the US. Probably the most influential of them, according to Brussels, was to force the member states to abandon the "South Stream" pipeline project intended for delivering the Russian gas to Europe bypassing Ukraine. Initially, in June, when Bulgaria announced that it was withdrawing from the project (the first European section of the pipeline should have run through Bulgaria), it seemed that Moscow appeared in a hopeless situation since it would have both substantial economic – several years and significant financial resources have been spent for project preparation – and political losses – Russia would lose an important lever to influence the Ukrainian issue. Nevertheless, the President of Russia V. Putin, during his visit to Ankara at the end of 2014, introduced Moscow's ingenious solution to that complex problem. The President announced that Russia had abandoned the "South Stream" project and had instead initiated a new "Turkish Stream" project. Certainly, it is not an entirely new project, since it proposes to transport all the gas intended for "South Stream" project (63 billion cubic metres) via the starting point of the same route, i.e. through the gas pipeline under the Black Sea; and to sell it to Turkey. Europe will

²⁷ Davutoğlu A., *Stratejik ...*, Op. cit., p. 119.

²⁸ Davutoğlu A., *Turkey's ...*, Op. cit.

have to buy gas from Ankara, since Russia has nothing to offer to the European countries purchasing a significant portion of their gas reserves from Moscow. Meanwhile, there will be no serious ground behind purchasing gas from Turkey. In April 2015 in Budapest the foreign ministers of Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary discussed their countries participation in “Turkish Stream” project, and all four states approved it.

“Turkish stream” opens up such prospects for Turkey many European countries could only dream about. It is not accidental that Turkey not only refused to join the anti-Russian sanctions, but it constantly deepens the economic cooperation with Moscow regardless of its NATO partners. Moreover, Turkey’s President R. Erdogan proposes a Russia-Turkey-Iran alliance which will drastically change the geopolitical situation in the Middle East. Along with Qatar, Iran initiated production of gas from “North Pars”, the world’s largest gas field²⁹. The prospects become more complete while regarding significant gas reserves found in the offshore areas of Cyprus, Lebanon and particularly, Israel. These countries are seeking to export gas to Europe in near future, which can be realized in two ways. The first possible route is through the Turkish territory, reaching under the Mediterranean Sea to Cyprus, then to Greece, finally, by land, to Europe. Ankara has several arguments in favor of running these streams through its territory, i.e. unresolved conflict in Cyprus, complex financial and economic situation in Greece. Still, there are serious challenges on the Turkish path as well. The regulation of huge streams of energy supplies requires proper financial and political resources. In terms of the first, the above-mentioned trilateral alliance, suggested by Erdogan, is rather promising. However, the relevant “price” should be paid for its realization. Russia will never agree to the transit of Iranian gas through TANAP which will create an alternative to Russian gas for Europe. Therefore, Ankara should solve the problem of interest clashes with Azerbaijan since the importance of the latter for Europe can only gain substantial grounds in case of transporting Iranian gas through TANAP. Meanwhile, the transit of Israeli gas is possible through the restoration of Ankara’s cooperation with that

²⁹ Станислав Тарасов. Станет ли Путин Лениным, а Эрдоган – Ататюрком, available at: www.regnum.ru/news/1872663.html (20.12.2014)

country recently been deteriorated. The talks on gas issue may contribute to this. However, it should as well be noted that the ad hoc solutions (the deterioration of relations with Israel a few years ago for getting closer to the Arab / Muslim world; further the attempts towards their improvement for the sake of gas routes) remove Ankara from one of the key principles of “Neo-Ottomanism”, i.e. special relations with the Muslim World. The analysis of the events taking place in the Middle East and South Caucasus reveals another potentially serious problem for Turkey. After the Russian-Georgian War of 2008, in terms of any significant event in these regions, Turkey never advocated the US position in case when at least in four of the afore-mentioned cases that position has been favourable for Moscow. Certainly, the aim was not to back Russia, but rather to appear in a privileged position in times of escalated tension among other influential countries. If the first attempts, given their small and temporary consequences, could not provoke a “harsh” reaction of the US, the case of the “Turkish Stream” turned out to be quite different. Indeed, the US efforts directed to the failure of the project do not explicitly refer to Ankara, but only due to the fact that their high efficiency could be guaranteed only if addressed to the “weaker links” of the chain. Hochstein, the US State Department’s special envoy, after talks with Lafazanis, the Minister of Productive Reconstruction, Environment and Energy of Greece, announced³⁰ that the “Turkish Stream” is undesirable for the US. He advised Greece to abandon that project and to focus on the Trans Adriatic pipeline (TAP). However, the government of Greece considers the “Turkish Stream” to be beneficial for the country and will make efforts for its implementation³¹. Considering the complex financial and economic situation in Greece, it can be assumed that this country will be more determined than Bulgaria which easily abandoned the “South Stream”. Nevertheless, it is easy to guess that the pressures on Athens will grow. Moreover, they can be more tangible from the European Union. Another “weak link” in the afore-mentioned chain of

³⁰ US urges Athens to focus on TAP, not Turkish Stream, available at: <http://www.infobalkans.com/2015/05/08/us-urges-athens-focus-tap-not-turkish-stream>, (14.01.2015)

³¹ США прямо заявили, что не хотят участия Греции в «Турецком потоке», available at: www.regnum.ru/news/1923051.html

countries is Macedonia. Though it is not an EU member and the possibilities of Brussels influence are not great, there is another more influential factor – an Albanian community in Macedonia, which enjoys the support of the governments of Kosovo and Albania. It is aggressive, has military units and has a significant impact on country's domestic policy. There is a view³² that the organized protests against the government of Macedonia (the latter constantly rejects any Western guidance on country's governance issues) aim to prevent “color revolutions” and the construction of the “Turkish Stream” pipeline across the territory of that country. Such attempts are being backed by the external forces sharing similar experience. The Albanian community in Macedonia plays an active role in these activities. In this respect, the third factor of “Neo-Ottomanism” defined by Taspinar should be regarded with certain reservation: “in case there is no clash of interests with the US”, since Washington has no equal rival in terms of the impact it has in the Balkans, and, particularly, on the Muslim communities of that region.

The afore-mentioned possibilities are also fading away regarding the ongoing military actions in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, long-term solutions to the problem of neutralizing one of the major parties of these actions – the organization of “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) – are not envisioned. The problems connected with these two states are not limited to the transit issues of energy supplies. Ankara not only fails to establish stable relations with both of them as neighboring and Muslim countries, but, at times, the situation is even extremely exacerbated.

In terms of its relations with the neighbouring countries, the situation in the South Caucasus seems better. Still, there are certain tradition-like (Armenia, the issues on the recognition of the Armenian Genocide and Nagorno-Karabakh) and potential tensions (Azerbaijan, transit route for the Iranian gas) in the region.

What refers to the first principle in the table – preservation of balance between democracy and security – it is obvious that though it concerns the domestic policy, its implementation level is fully reflected

³² США готовят в Македонии «цветную революцию» против «Турецкого потока», available at: www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1922213.html (22.01.2015)

by the assessment given with regard to country's progress in fulfilling its obligations of EU accession³³. In this respect, Turkey has registered significant achievements; since the arrival of the AKP to power, the foreign policy has gradually passed under full control of political power, depriving the military from the levers of influence on foreign policy it traditionally mastered³⁴. However, the number of shortcomings in implementing undertaken commitments is so great that the overall negative assessment is not open to question. Still, the major objective of Turkish foreign policy under A. Davutoglu is to join the EU. Considering Ankara's relations with Russia increasingly developing at the moment, it should be assumed that in near future the European structures will demand more from Turkey regarding its failure in fulfilling the obligations of membership it has undertaken. It is not accidental that J. Hahn, the European Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, announced that Turkey's attacks on the European countries regarding the issue of the Armenian Genocide only complicate Turkey's accession to the EU³⁵. The resolution adopted by the European Parliament on the Armenian Genocide centenary also confirm the hardening attitude of the EU towards Ankara³⁶. However, it is also apparent that the possible steps towards the implementation of this principle will not only make Turkey closer to the EU, but will alienate the country from the Muslim world, and thus, from Neo-Ottomanism. It is practically impossible to find an intermediate position offering solution to both problems since both sides are based on entirely different, and in some cases even conflicting ideas and values. From this perspective, the

³³ European Parliament resolution on the situation in Turkey, June 13, 2013, Strasbourg, 13.06.2013, available at

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013-0277+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> (03.01.2015).

³⁴ **Murinson A.**, *Op. cit.*

³⁵ EU Commissioner: Turkey's Reaction over Armenian Genocide may Complicate EU ambitions, available at <http://news.am/arm/news/264682.html>, (30.01.2015).

³⁶ Armenian genocide centenary: MEPs urge Turkey and Armenia to normalize relations, available at:

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20150413IPR41671/html/Armenian-genocide-centenary-MEPs-urge-Turkey-and-Armenia-to-normalize-relations>, (15.02.2015)

inclusion of this principle in “Strategic Depth” doctrine can serve a good rationale for A. Davutoglu to claim that their policy should not be labeled as “Neo-Ottomanism”. Still, it will not ease the situation.

One can notice that the proclaimed principles in any direction either do not function at all or function with big reservations. Davutoglu seeks to prevent such assessments prevalent in a number of recent works devoted to the analysis of Ankara’s foreign policy. He has been trying to prove that the policy he developed is not a failed one³⁷. However, the failure is also pointed out in the works that address the issue indirectly. Particularly, Taspinar notes that in future the current developments may lead to the establishment of a new political doctrine synchronizing the ideologies of “Neo-Ottomanism” and “Kemalism”. The author uses the term “Turkish Gaullism” to describe this potentially new doctrine. The latter suggests that the country needs to pursue a more independent and self-confident policy outside the framework of the Western military and political alliance. According to Taspinar, Turkey can choose that pathway, and the fundamental commonalities between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism (particularly, the prevalence of national interest) can serve to this end³⁸. Obviously, new political doctrine is being proposed at a time when the current one has exhausted itself or is not efficient any longer.

To describe the current state and the changes in Turkey’s foreign policy, A. Davutoglu used the figurative approach: ““In 2001 Turkey looked like a human being with strong muscles, an empty stomach, a feeble brain, and an unhealthy heart. Strong muscles meant a strong army, an empty stomach meant a weak economy, a feeble brain was the lack of strategic vision, and a weak heart – complete absence of self-confidence. Now Turkey is transformed. The army continues to be strong, which is a must in our region. We now have a strong economy.

³⁷ **Davutoglu A.**, Zero Problems in a New Era, *Foreign Policy Magazine*, 21.03.2013, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/21/zero_problems_in_a_new_era_turkey (11.11.2014).

³⁸ **Taspinar Ö.**, The three strategic visions of Turkey,- *US-Europe Analysis Series*, Number 50, March 8, 2011, Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings, 1-5.

And to have a strong economy you need a strategic vision (good brain)³⁹. It is easy to notice that while describing Turkey in 2012, A. Davutoglu does not mention at all one of four principles of its proposed model – the “heart”. As for the brain, he addresses it referring to the future: “you need”. The given assessment properly describes modern Turkey but also asserts that this activity is truly devoid of theoretical and ideological grounds.

Conclusion

The comparative analysis of “Strategic Depth” doctrine and “Neo-Ottomanism” ideology, as well as Turkey’s foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party within the comparative context demonstrates that

1. After the breakup of the Soviet Union and the establishment of New World Order, the varieties of “Neo-Ottomanism” ideology has constituted the bases of foreign policy approaches adopted by all more or less influential political figures of Turkey. “Strategic Depth” doctrine and “Neo-Ottomanism” ideology share significant features; and the first, although with some reservations, can be considered a variety of the second, which turned into the basis of Turkey's foreign policy under the AKP.
2. Though under the AKP’s rule the Turkish authorities make continuous efforts to demonstrate that the basis of country’s foreign policy lies in the five principles of “Strategic Depth” doctrine, the analysis of policy implementation points to essential differences between proclaimed principles and the results of applied policy.
3. In terms of the policy pursued in neighbouring regions, Ankara has registered significant achievements only in the Balkans – a

³⁹ **Davutoglu A.**, World’s a stage for Turkey, Interview by Ahmet Davutoğlu published in The Australian Newspaper (Australia) on 21 January 2012, available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/interview-by-h_e_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-published-in-the-australian-newspaper-australia-on-21-january-2012.en.mfa (11.11.2014).

region less significant in terms of geopolitical rivalry than the Middle East and South Caucasus.

4. Turkey not only failed to pursue “zero problems with neighbours” policy, but, what is more, to reduce the number of the neighbours it has serious problems with.
5. The establishment of multi-dimensional relations with great powers is not accomplished either due to the tactics of the ad hoc solutions. In this respect, no single change can be registered as compared to Kemalist foreign policy. The policy is typical to the countries appeared in a complex situation and to those with the limited opportunities of choice. Thus, there are no real grounds for Neo-Ottomanism in foreign relations. Moreover, the use of this tactics can make Turkey face serious challenges in near future for it results in Ankara’s imbalanced position regarding its relations with the three great powers of the afore-mentioned regions – the US, Russia, and the EU.
6. The processes of new world order formation created new prospects for a significant improvement of Turkey’s positions in case of accomplishing the transfer of gas reserves from the South Caucasus and Middle East to Europe in a proper format. To this end, Turkey should overcome an array of complex challenges and solve several multidimensional problems. The tactics of ad hoc solutions having been used for the last century is not the best possibility of addressing these problems.